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Abstract—A significant portion of what is known about
Internet routing stems out from public BGP datasets. For this
reason, numerous research efforts were devoted to (i) assessing
the (in)completeness of the datasets, (ii) identifying biases in the
dataset, and (iii) augmenting data quality by optimally placing
new collectors. However, those studies focused on techniques to
extract information about the AS-level Internet topology.
In this paper, we show that considering different metrics
influences the conclusions about biases and collector placement.
Namely, we compare AS-level topology discovery with iBGP pol-
icy inference. We find that the same datasets exhibit significantly
diverse biases for these two metrics. For example, the sensitivity
to the number and position of collectors is noticeably different.
Moreover, for both metrics, the marginal utility of adding a new
collector is strongly localized with respect to the proximity of the
collector. Our results suggest that the “optimal” position for new
collectors can only be defined with respect to a specific metric,
hence posing a fundamental trade-off for maximizing the utility
of extensions to the BGP data collection infrastructure.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet is a global network connecting different do-
mains or Autonomous Systems (ASes) together. Each AS is
typically administered by a different Internet Service Provider
(ISP). In the following, we will use the terms AS and ISP
interchangeably. To exchange inter-domain routing information
on Internet destinations with other ASes, each ISP needs to
configure the Border Gateway Protocol [1] (BGP). Actually,
BGP consists of two protocols: eBGP and iBGP. External BGP
(eBGP) is used between routers in different ASes. Conversely,
internal BGP (iBGP) is used by routers in a single AS to
distribute the routes learned via eBGP.
One key feature of both eBGP and iBGP is the support
for highly customizable routing policies. ISPs configure eBGP
policies to tune inter-domain routing choices at a fine level
of granularity [2]. Moreover, to meet traffic engineering goals
within their own network, they can and do [3] use iBGP poli-
cies, e.g., policies on internal BGP routers. While eBGP rout-
ing policies are deeply studied (e.g., [2], [4], [5]), few things
are known about iBGP policies. Nevertheless, estimating the
popularity of iBGP policies has important implications [6] on
the applicability of previously proposed theoretical insights
(e.g., [7]), protocol enhancements (e.g., [8]), and tools (e.g.,
[9]), which assume that policies are applied solely in eBGP.
The presence of iBGP policies can be detected based on
public BGP data [3]. BGP datasets such as RIPE RIS [10]
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and Oregon Routeviews [11] consist of sets of BGP messages
stored by collector peers (CPs).
In this paper, we analyze the biases of public BGP datasets
with respect to iBGP policy inference. In particular, we com-
pare iBGP policy inference biases with those affecting Internet
topology discovery techniques [12], [13]. We evaluate three
main factors that can bias inter-domain link detection, iBGP
policy inference, or both metrics: prefix visibility from the
CPs, number of available CPs, and position of the CPs. The
importance of those factors derives from their direct impact on
the number and kind of BGP messages received by CPs, hence
on their information on the BGP routing system. To analyze
the impact of the considered factors on both inter-domain
link detection and iBGP policy inference, we systematically
evaluate the respective sensitivity of the two metrics. Due to
the unavailability of ground truth, we quantify the sensitivity
by carefully slicing an initial dataset into multiple smaller
datasets, in such a way that the bias is exposed.
Our results show that the factors affecting the quality of
iBGP policy inference significantly differ from those identified
by previous work for topology discovery. Interestingly, the
ability to detect iBGP policies is more sensitive than topol-
ogy discovery to the per-CP prefix visibility. Moreover, the
quality of iBGP policy inference is also more sensitive to
the number of CPs, especially because BGP datasets tend to
exhibit less redundancy for iBGP policy inference than for
topology discovery. This suggests that, unless new CPs are
added deliberately to improve the quality of link detection,
extensions of the monitoring infrastructure are likely to be
more beneficial for iBGP policy inference. More in general,
our findings suggest that the quality of BGP datasets vary
significantly depending on the considered metric.
Finally, complementing recent research efforts [13], [14],
we study the marginal utility of new CPs for inter-domain link
and iBGP policy inference. We observe that, for both cases,
the marginal utility is highly localized in the proximity of the
CP, even though the localization effect is more evident for link
detection than for iBGP policy inference. Our results also show
that new CPs can hardly be placed in such a way to maximize
the increased accuracy for both metrics at the same time.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec. II
presents the required background for this paper. Sec. III
provides details on our dataset and on our bias comparison
methodology. Sec. IV evaluates the impact of prefix visibility
at the CPs. Sec. V discusses the impact of the number of
CPs. Sec. VI analyses the impact of the CP position. Sec. VII
relates this paper to existing literature on BGP datasets. Finally,
conclusions are drawn in Sec. VIII.ISBN 978-3-901882-58-6 c© 2014 IFIP
Step Criterion
1 Prefer routes with higher local-preference
2 Prefer routes with lower as-path length
3 Prefer routes with lower origin
4 Among the routes received from the same AS neighbor, prefer those
having lower MED
5 Prefer routes learned via eBGP to those learned via iBGP
6 Prefer routes with lower IGP metric to the egress point
7 Prefer the route having the lowest router-id
TABLE I. STEPS IN THE BGP DECISION PROCESS.
II. BACKGROUND
This section presents the required background for this
paper. We first focus on the basics of BGP (Sec. II-A).
Next, we introduce inference techniques for AS-level Internet
topology (Sec. II-B) and for iBGP policies (Sec. II-C).
A. BGP and BGP Collector Peers (CPs)
In BGP [1] (both eBGP and iBGP), reachability informa-
tion of IP destinations is represented by routes. Each route
associates a destination prefix to a set of attributes. When
a BGP router learns a route to a given prefix, it possibly
modifies some of the attributes in the route, picks its best
route for that prefix, and sends its best route to all its BGP
neighbors. The best route is selected by executing the BGP
decision process summarized in Table I. Essentially, a route is
selected as best based on the associated attribute values. By
configuring routers to modify BGP attributes, operators can
accommodate specific high-level goals, e.g., achieving fine-
grained control of outgoing traffic [15].
In this paper, we apply inference techniques to public
BGP datasets. Those datasets consist of BGP routes collected
by geographically-distributed vantage points deployed within
RIPE RIS [10] and Oregon RouteViews [11] projects. BGP
vantage points are technically called collector peers (CPs).
As an illustration, consider the BGP network shown in
Fig. 1. In this figure, each AS is depicted as a cloud, router
icons show the placement of BGP routers, and square magnifier
icons represent CPs. Black segments represent BGP sessions,
and the flag icon indicates a prefix p originated by AS 4. In
the example, ASX uses iBGP route reflection [16] as indicated
by the absence of a full-mesh of iBGP sessions inside ASX .
For simplicity, we assume that the local-preference
attribute is set to a default value of 100 by each BGP router
in the figure, i.e., we temporarily ignore the callouts in the
example. As soon as E1 receives a BGP route to p by its
eBGP neighbor in AS 4, it runs the BGP decision process and
selects it as the best route to p. In fact, even if E1 receives a
route to p traversing E2 and AS 3, the direct route through its
eBGP neighbor in AS 4 has a shorter as-path length, hence
it will be preferred. E1 will then propagate its best route to its
iBGP neighbor R1, which will select it as its best. Eventually,
the route with as-path (AS 1, AS X,AS 4) will reach C1,
which will store it in the standard MRT format [17].
B. AS-level Topology Discovery
While hiding the internal structure of ISPs, eBGP routes
contain explicit information about traversed inter-domain paths
at the AS-level granularity. Indeed, one of the attributes carried
in each eBGP route is the as-path, i.e., the sequence of
Fig. 1. Example BGP network with two vantage points (i.e., C1 and C2)
and an AS deploying iBGP policies (i.e., AS X).
ASes traversed by the given route. Thanks to the as-path
attribute, we can partially reconstruct the Internet AS-level
topology [18], where inter-domain links are represented by
edges in a graph. Internet AS-level topology discovery can
then be based on BGP routes only. Given a set of BGP routes,
an inter-domain link between two ASes AS 1 and AS 2 can
be detected each time AS 1 and AS 2 appear as consecutive
ASes in the as-path of a BGP route. This approach has
a one-side error, i.e., it never reports a non-existing link as
existing but it may not be able to detect all the inter-domain
links in the Internet. In the following, we refer to inter-domain
links inferred through this technique as detected links.
Consider the example in Fig. 1. Assume that C1 stored,
at a given time, a BGP route to prefix p with AS path
(AS 1, AS X,AS 4), e.g., as a result of the BGP route
propagation described in Sec. II-A. From this route, we can
detect inter-domain links (AS 1, AS X) and (AS X,AS 4).
Unfortunately, it provides no evidence of the presence of AS 3
nor of any of its inter-domain links with AS X and AS 4.
We might be able to reconstruct the full AS-level topology in
the example if C1 collected routes to other destinations (e.g.,
prefixes originated by AS 3), or if other public CPs (e.g., C2)
provided different BGP routes traversing AS 3.
C. iBGP Policies
Most of the existing literature (e.g., [2], [7], [9]) assumes
that iBGP acts as a simple dispatcher of inter-domain routes,
with routing policies applied exclusively to eBGP sessions.
However, a significant amount of ISPs do apply iBGP poli-
cies [3], in the sense that they intentionally modify attributes
on iBGP messages, e.g., to increase internal routing flexibility
and improve traffic engineering. Consider again the example in
Fig. 1. As shown by the callouts in the figure and highlighted
by the filled-in cloud, AS X is applying iBGP policies. In
particular, those policies ensure that BGP routers R1 and R2
respectively prefer routes through E1 and E2, e.g., for intra-
domain traffic load balancing.
To estimate the number of ISPs that apply iBGP policies,
Cittadini et al. [3] proposed a technique computing a conserva-
tive lower bound. The inference is based on looking in public
BGP datasets for evidences of BGP routers in the same AS
that steadily select distinct routes that are not equally good
up to the first three steps of the BGP decision process (see
Table I). Indeed, assuming connected iBGP topologies inside
each AS, only routes that are equally good up through the
first three BGP decision steps can be steadily selected by
iBGP routers in the absence of iBGP policies (see, e.g., [19]).
Hence, whenever two or more routes with different as-path
lengths are simultaneously active at a given AS X , it can be
inferred that AS X is applying iBGP policies. To compute
the set of routes that are simultaneously active at each AS,
Cittadini et al. leverage the technique by Mu¨hlbauer et al. [20]
and compare BGP routes gathered by different vantage points.
Observe that, by definition, this technique has a one-side error,
that is, it never misreports ASes deploying iBGP policies. In
the following, we refer to ASes which we infer applying iBGP
policies with this technique as inferred ASes.
As an illustration of the iBGP policy inference technique,
consider again Fig. 1. Two CPs C1 and C2 are respectively
located in AS 1 and AS 2. Consider the BGP routes collected
by those two CPs after BGP route propagation over the net-
work. Given the iBGP policies applied by AS X , C1 and C2
will store a BGP route with as-path (AS 1, AS X,AS 4)
and (AS 2, AS X,AS 3, AS 4), respectively. From those two
routes, it is possible to infer that routers in AS X simultane-
ously select two different routes to prefix p, a condition known
as route diversity [20]. Moreover, the two routes have different
as-path length. Since this cannot happen in a connected
iBGP topology without iBGP policies, we can conclude that
AS X is applying iBGP policies.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we describe the public BGP dataset that we
study (Sec. III-A) and the methodology that we adopt to expose
biases for the considered inference techniques (Sec. III-B).
A. Dataset
Our dataset consists of BGP routing table dumps from
RIS [10] collectors on September 16th, 2012, i.e., a random
day reasonably far from any Western festivity. Since we addi-
tionally use table dumps on the same day (i.e., September 16th)
for every year between 2009 and 2011 as validation datasets
(i.e., to validate our results), we exclude all the collectors
that were not up and running during any of the selected
dates, namely, rrc02, rrc07, rrc08, rrc09, rrc14, and
rrc16. Furthermore, we perform sample tests to cross-check
our results with datasets from few other random days in
September and October.
Observe that our dataset is much smaller than the one
used in [3]: not only we select a subset of route collectors
in order to have consistent snapshots over time, but we restrict
ourselves to BGP table dumps, disregarding routing updates.
It is known [3] that a significant amount of real-world ISPs
do apply iBGP policies. Of course, the estimates obtained in
our experiments are much lower than the one described in [3].
In this paper, however, we specifically focus on understanding
what are the intrinsic limitations of the data provided by public
BGP collectors with respect to our ability to pinpoint ISPs that
apply iBGP policies. To this end, considering only routing
tables does not introduce biases, as the inference technique is
based on snapshots of routing information at a given point in
time. In fact, considering BGP updates can be seen as just a
way to extract multiple snapshots near in time.
B. Assessing Biases Without Ground Truth
It is known that public BGP data are biased. For instance,
they tend to capture certain types of links between ASes much
better than others [13], [21]. For both AS-level topology dis-
covery and iBGP policies inference, estimating the bias is non-
trivial due to the lack of ground truth. Indeed, ISPs are very
reluctant to disclose details about their BGP configurations. For
this reason, we take the full dataset as a baseline, and study
each inference technique on selected subsets of the dataset,
which we call sub-datasets. Namely, we extract sub-datasets
to expose a specific bias with respect to the full dataset.
We analyze multiple potential biasing factors (i.e., number
of CPs, position of CPs, prefix visibility for each CP). For
each factor, we pick specific sub-datasets, we perform link
discovery and iBGP policy inference on them, and we compare
the respective results with each other, and with those obtained
using the full dataset. Such a differential approach provides us
with a repeatable and statistically significant comparison of the
relative influence of the different biasing factors. Moreover, it
allows us to compare the two inference techniques with each
other. However, our methodology cannot be used to quantify
the absolute biases that are possibly present in the full dataset.
Given that the ground truth is not publicly available, the same
drawback also applies to any other measurement methodology.
To make sure that our analyses are not biased by the
specific selection of the full dataset, we cross-validate our
results by applying the same methodology to our validation
datasets, consisting of RIS table dumps taken on September
16th of years 2009, 2010, and 2011. For the sake of brevity,
since we got extremely similar results across all validation
datasets, we only report the results on the full 2012 dataset in
the following.
IV. PREFIX VISIBILITY
To encourage wide adoption, BGP data collection infras-
tructures [10], [11] do not enforce standardization across CPs.
For example, no restrictions are imposed on the quantity and
quality of BGP messages that CPs are expected to provide. As
a consequence, not all CPs provide information about the full
set of globally routable prefixes in the Internet, i.e., the full
Routing Information Base (RIB). Ideally, the full RIB contains
all the prefixes in the “default free zone” of the Internet, which
is the portion of the Internet that cannot use a default route
to ensure global connectivity. However, such a definition has
been shown to be not applicable in practice [21]. Throughout
the paper, we define the full RIB to be the maximum number
of unique prefixes seen by a single CP.
Consider Fig. 2. The line with square points indicates the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the percentage of
the full RIB seen by CPs in our dataset. The distribution is
bimodal, with roughly 80% of the CPs having visibility of
less than 30% of the RIB, and roughly 20% of the CPs having
visibility of more than 85%. We denote CPs having visibility
less than or greater than 50% of the RIB as “partial CPs” or
“full CPs”, respectively. The distribution is dominated by CPs
deployed in Internet Exchange Points (IXPs)1, which are more
likely to have visibility of only a restricted subset of prefixes.
1information on the location of CPs is extracted from the RIS Web site [10]
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Fig. 2. CDF of the percentage of the global RIB seen by each CP.
The line with circle points in Fig. 2 shows the distribution of
the subset of CPs that are not located in an IXP. A plausible
explanation is that operators often configure CPs with the same
routing policies that they apply to other members of the same
IXP. The smaller differences among CPs in the same class can
be explained by route aggregation and specific routing policies
applied by ISPs [13].
It is clear that having CPs with higher prefix visibility is
beneficial for topology discovery. In fact, there is a very high
correlation between seeing more prefixes and being aware of
a bigger portion of the Internet AS-level graph. Our ability to
infer iBGP policies also increases as the number of prefixes
seen by CPs increase, because there is a higher chance that
two CPs can observe route diversity. While both metrics benefit
from increased visibility, there is a fundamental difference: link
detection benefits from CPs seeing different prefixes, whereas
iBGP policy inference benefits from CPs seeing the same
prefix. We now study whether this difference leads to different
sensitivity of the two metrics.
To quantify the sensitivity of both metrics to the number
of prefixes seen by CPs, we generate sub-datasets (as defined
in Sec. III) by filtering out CPs that see more than k prefixes,
for k = 1, 000, 2, 000, . . . , 10, 000, 20, 000, . . . 200, 000. Each
sub-dataset contains CPs tracking a fraction, ranging from
roughly 0.2% to about 42%, of the full RIB. For each sub-
dataset, we compute the ratio of the number of inferred ASes
in the sub-dataset and the number of inferred ASes in the
full dataset. Moreover, we compute the same ratio considering
detected links instead of inferred ASes.
Fig. 3 shows the results of those experiments. Each circle
(resp. square) data point (x, y) indicates that CPs with a
visibility of at most x% of the full RIB are able to detect y%
of the links (resp., ASes) that can be discovered by considering
the full dataset. To ease comparison, we also plot a straight
line representing linear increase (i.e., y = x). Fig. 3 highlights
different absolute values but similar trends for link detection
and iBGP policy inference. Both metrics exhibit a growing
trend which is roughly linear but quantized. The quantization
effect can be easily explained by the skewed distribution of
prefix visibility (see Fig. 2). The difference between the two
curves is more significant when we constrain the visibility to
be less than 4% of the RIB. A plausible explanation is that, for
those sub-datasets, there are so few CPs and so few prefixes
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Fig. 3. Comparison of the impact of prefix visibility on link detection (circles)
and iBGP policy inference (squares).
that it is highly unlikely that two CPs collect information on
the same prefix, which is a precondition to infer iBGP policies.
V. NUMBER AND POSITION OF CPS
In this section, we analyze the sensitivity of our metrics
with respect to the number and position of CPs in our datasets.
In particular, Sec. V-A contains analyses on the absolute
number of CPs, and Sec. V-B studies the impact of the position
of CPs in the hierarchy of ASes in the Internet.
A. Number of CPs and Information Redundancy
Intuitively, a higher number of CPs corresponds to more
BGP routes in the dataset, hence increased accuracy for both
link detection and iBGP policy inference. We now study
whether the impact of the number of CPs is proportional for
both metrics. To this end, we build sub-datasets by selecting
CPs from the full dataset uniformly at random. More precisely,
for n = 1, . . . , 10, we randomly build a sub-dataset containing
1/n of the CPs in the dataset. For statistical relevance, we
repeat the process 30 times, resulting in 30 sub-datasets for
each value of n. Then, we compute the number of detected
links and of inferred ASes on each sub-dataset.
The boxplot in Fig. 4 summarizes the results of these
experiments. The lower (resp. upper) end of the whisker
represents the minimum (resp. maximum) value measured
across the 30 sub-datasets sharing the same value of n. The
lower (resp. upper) end of the box represents the first (resp.
third) quartile and the thick horizontal line within the box
represents the median.
The plot highlights that, as the number of CPs in each
sub-dataset decreases, the number of detected links exhibits a
smoother decreasing trend with respect to the inferred ASes.
For example, we are able to detect roughly 70% of the links
using just 1/10th of the available CPs (see Fig. 4a). With the
same sub-dataset, we can only infer about 50% of the ASes
(see Fig. 4b). As a matter of comparison, we need at least
three times more CPs (1/3rd as opposed to 1/10th) to infer a
comparable proportion (roughly 70%) of the ASes with iBGP
policy. In addition, the variability of both metrics increases as
the cardinality of sub-datasets decreases. However, for sub-
datasets with the same cardinality, iBGP policy inference
exhibits more variability than link detection. This can be






































Fig. 4. Distribution of the number of the detected links and inferred ASes for different random selections of CPs. The full dataset (i.e., the 100% mark on the
y-axis) contains 122160 unique links and 399 ASes for which we were able to detect iBGP policies.
explained as a consequence of the disproportional sensitivity
of the two metrics to prefix visibility (see Sec. IV). Indeed,
CPs with high visibility are more likely to be excluded from
smaller sub-datasets.
Fig. 4 suggests that our dataset contains more redundant
information for link detection than for iBGP policy inference.
However, by comparing those sub-datasets, we can only extract
qualitative information. Indeed, the considered sub-datasets
do not take into account that specific detected links (or,
respectively, inferred ASes) have potentially different redun-
dancy. For example, there might be links (or ASes) that are
intrinsically easier to infer, hence more likely to be detected
in each sub-dataset.
In order to remove this uncertainty and quantify the differ-
ence in redundancy between the two metrics, we introduce the
concept of critical CPs. A set of CPs is critical for a link (resp.
AS) if removing them from the dataset makes us unable to
detect that link (resp. AS). For inter-domain links, computing
the set of critical CPs corresponds to find all CPs that can see
each link. For ASes with iBGP policies, however, computing
the set of critical CPs requires a deeper understanding of the
technique [20] that we use to capture route diversity. For an
AS A and a prefix p, let RA,p be the set of distinct routes to
p from A. Note that each route in RA,p is seen by at least one
CP. If RA,p contains a single route (|RA,p| = 1) or no routes
(|RA,p| = 0), then we are unable to infer iBGP policies for
AS A using routes to prefix p. The set of critical CPs for A is
then defined as the minimum number of CPs removing which
we have |RA,p| < 2 for all prefixes p.
For each detected link and inferred AS, we compute the
corresponding set of critical CPs, and we calculate the ratio
of the number of critical CPs to the total number of available
CPs. For both detected links and inferred ASes, a higher value
of the ratio corresponds to a greater redundancy in the dataset,
by definition of critical CP.
Fig. 5 shows the CDF of the critical CP ratio for link
discovery and iBGP policy inference. Each circle (resp. square)
data point (x, y) indicates that y×100% of detected links (resp.
inferred ASes) have a critical CP set of at most x× 100% of
the available CPs. This analysis confirms that the information
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Fig. 5. Comparison of the fraction of critical CPs for topology discovery
(circles) and iBGP policy inference (squares).
provided by the CPs in the dataset for link discovery is more
redundant than for iBGP policy inference. Indeed, the size
of the critical CP set is generally bigger for link detection
than it is for iBGP policy inference. For example, the most
redundant inferred ASes have a set of critical CPs of circa
10% of the available CPs, while roughly half of the detected
links show more redundancy. It is also interesting to observe
that, for both metrics, roughly 20% of the links or ASes have
very few critical CPs (less than 1% of the CPs). This suggests
that the position of a CP have a strong correlation with the
amount of information that we can extract from it. We deepen
the study of this aspect in Section VI.
B. Position in the Internet Hierarchy
It is known that, due to how ISPs apply BGP policies, the
position of CPs in the Internet hierarchy affects their ability to
measure the AS-level graph. For example, Oliveira et al. [12]
classify each missing link as either “invisible” or “hidden”
to distinguish whether the dataset contains at least one CP
that should theoretically be able to detect that link. Customer-
provider links (i.e., links between two ASes where one is
buying transit service from the other) cannot be invisible,






































Fig. 6. Breakdown of CP inference power per class of ASes. The dashed lines represent the number of links or ASes with iBGP policies detected in the 95%
of the experiments.
as opposed to peer-peer links (i.e., links between two ASes
based on mutual exchange of selected traffic free of charge).
In particular, a peer-peer link between ASes A and B can
only be detected by CPs located in ASes that are (possibly
indirect) customers of either A or B. This bias in the dataset
is known, and a number of techniques have been proposed
to estimate the real number of peer-peer links in the Internet.
The most recent estimates (see, e.g., [22]) are several times
higher than the number that can be inferred from public BGP
datasets. Based on this observation, existing literature concurs
in placing new CPs at the bottom of the Internet hierarchy in
order to maximize the number of discovered peer-peer links.
We perform experiments to understand the correlation
between the position of CPs in the Internet hierarchy and our
ability to infer links and ASes. Based on the classification of
ASes proposed by Dhamdhere and Dovrolis [23], we classify
each AS in one of four categories: Enterprise Customers
(EC – mostly users that are not Internet access, transit, or
content providers), Small Transit Providers (STP – regional
ISPs), Large Transit Providers (LTP – international ISPs), and
Content, Access and Hosting Providers (CAHP – ISPs offering
Internet access and/or server hosting and/or content without
providing any kind of transit or access). For each category, we
build sub-datasets by randomly extracting CPs located in an
AS belonging to that category. Observe that the distribution
of CPs is not uniform across the categories, with 14% of CPs
being in ECs, 26% in STPs, 6% in LTPs, and 54% in CAHPs.
To avoid being biased by the differences in the distribution, we
extract the same number of CPs for each category. We select
the number of CPs by taking the half of the number of CPs in
the category having the least, resulting in sub-datasets of 15
CPs each. For statistical significance, we repeat the random
extraction of sub-datasets 30 times.
Fig. 6 shows the results of our experiments on those sub-
datasets. The boxes in the two plots show median, first and
third quartile, maximum and minimum values, with the same
graphical convention as in Fig. 4. Additionally, to highlight
the differences in the overlap of information between different
sub-datasets, we plot an horizontal line, which we refer to as
the baseline, and represent the number of links or ASes that
we were able to infer in at least 95% of all sub-datasets.
First of all, we note the difference in the percentages be-
tween inferred ASes and detected links. For every AS category,
the percentage of inferred ASes is significantly smaller than the
corresponding one of detected links, indicating that our ability
to infer iBGP policies is more dependent on the presence
of CPs in multiple AS categories. This is especially evident
by comparing the baselines for the two metrics. Note that
sub-datasets based on CPs in STPs and CAHPs show more
variability for both metrics. This could be an artifact of how
we extracted sub-datasets. In fact, since STPs and CAHPs host
the majority of CPs, extracting 15 CPs at random gives a higher
likelihood of including partial CPs in the sub-datasets. Median
values are less affected than variability by such an extraction
artifact. By looking at median values, we conclude that for
both metrics CPs in ECs and LTPs contribute more to our
inference ability than CPs in the other categories.
VI. MARGINAL UTILITY OF NEW CPS
In this section, we study the marginal utility of CPs for both
link detection and iBGP policy inference. Such a study can be
at the basis of CP placement strategies that try to optimize the
position of new CPs.
Computing the marginal utility for any given CP is actually
straightforward. Indeed, we can simply build a sub-dataset by
removing that CP, and compare the inference results on the
sub-dataset with the ones on the full dataset. Unfortunately,
when computed with this direct approach, the marginal utility
is close to zero for all CPs, mainly because of redundant
information in the dataset (see Sec. V-A). Interestingly, Barford
et al. [24] observed a similar effect for the marginal utility
of adding new traceroute sources. Thus, direct indicators of
marginal utility are almost meaningless for further analyses,
e.g., optimal CP placement.
To overcome this difficulty, we resort to using two indirect
indicators. In Sec. VI-A, we study how the marginal utility of
a CP is influenced by the AS-path distance between the CP
and the links (or ASes with iBGP policies) that it can infer. In
Sec. VI-B, we consider the diversity between the BGP routes
that it collects and those collected by the other CPs in the
dataset, and we study the relationship between such a diversity
and the marginal utility of that CP.
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Fig. 7. Distribution of the distance of ASes to the closest CP.
A. AS-Path Distance
Intuitively, the marginal utility of CPs for topology discov-
ery depends on the distance from the link to be inferred. In
particular, a CP C which is close to a link l has high probability
to collect a BGP route traversing that link. Conversely, as the
distance between C and l increases, not only the probability
that C can detect l decreases, but also the probability that
other CPs can detect l increases. For these reasons, a new
CP is unlike to provide useful information on a distant link.
For iBGP policy inference, instead, there is no intuitive reason
why the ability of a CP to detect an AS should be higher or
lower depending on its distance to that AS. In order to study
the relationship between marginal utility and proximity for
both link detection and iBGP policy inference, we define the
concept of AS-path distance. The AS-path distance dist(C,A)
between a CP C and an AS A is the minimum number of
hops from the AS hosting C to A in the as-path attribute
of any BGP route collected by C. In particular, if C collects
a BGP route such that the first hop in the as-path is
X , then dist(C,X) = 0. If X appears as the second hop,
dist(C,X) = 1, and so on. Similarly, we define the AS-
path distance between a CP C and a link l = (A1, A2) as
dist(C, l) = min(dist(C,A1), dist(C,A2)).
Note that AS-path distance is not simply the length of
the shortest path between two nodes in the Internet topology,
because it takes into account only as-paths that actually
appear in BGP routes collected by a given CP. This has three
important consequences. First, by definition, AS-path distance
honors BGP policies, i.e., it never reports a distance based on a
path that would not be allowed by BGP policies. Second, AS-
path distance takes into account route diversity: if two different
CPs are hosted by the same AS but they collect different routes,
their AS-path distances will differ accordingly. Third, AS-path
distance is not biased by potentially missing links in the AS-
level graph, because it depends only on collected BGP routes.
We leverage AS-path distance to build sub-datasets. For
each link l and integer k = 1, . . . , 5, we extract a sub-dataset
containing only CPs at a distance less than or equal to k
from l. We build sub-datasets for iBGP policy inference with a
similar procedure that considers distances from inferred ASes
instead of links. Using those sub-datasets, we finally compute
the minimum AS-path distances for each link l (resp. AS A) as
the minimum value of k such that l (resp. A) can be inferred.
Fig. 7 shows the distribution of the minimum AS-path
distances for all links (bars with vertical filling) and for ASes
with iBGP policies (bars with oblique filling). For example, the
vertical bar with coordinate x = 0 indicates that for roughly
36% of the links, a link can be detected from a CP at distance
0, i.e., a CP in one of the two ASes forming the link.
Generally speaking, the plot shows that only a tiny fraction
(less than 6%) of links and ASes with iBGP policies have been
inferred thanks to information provided by distant CPs, i.e.,
at a distance greater than 2. Given the average length of AS
paths in the Internet (i.e., about 4 and growing very slowly
over time [23]), it is quite surprising that a CP can give useful
information on ASes (or links) that are 4 or 5 hops away. On
the contrary, for the vast majority of both discovered links and
inferred ASes, CPs providing non-redundant information are
at a distance smaller than 3 from links and ASes, respectively.
This suggests that, with high probability, the marginal utility
of new CPs is localized. As the Internet becomes denser [23]
and as more CPs are added to the measurement infrastructure,
we expect this localization effect to be amplified, leading to
diminishing marginal utility of single CPs.
B. Routing State Distance
The marginal utility of adding a new CP intuitively depends
on the diversity of BGP routes that it collects with respect to
the routes already in the dataset. For example, if each and every
BGP route collected by the new CP were already present in
the dataset, the CP would have no marginal utility at all.
Recently, Gu¨rsun et al. [25] have proposed a metric, called
routing state distance (RSD), to quantify the diversity of BGP
routes. In particular, RSD considers all the collected BGP
routes to each prefix pair to compute and compare the routing
states of the two prefixes. Gu¨rsun et al. define the routing
state RS(p) of a prefix p as the directed graph obtained by
merging all AS-paths in BGP routes for p. Then, they define
the routing state distance between two prefixes p1 and p2 as
|RS(p1) ⊕ RS(p2)|, where ⊕ denotes the XOR between the
two graphs (i.e., their union minus their intersection).
Since we need to compare BGP routes collected by differ-
ent CPs rather than towards different prefixes, we adapt the
definition of routing state. Namely, we define the routing state
RS(C) of a CP C as the directed graph obtained by merging
all AS-paths in the routes collected by C. Unfortunately, the
vanilla definition of RSD between two CPs C1 and C2, i.e.,
|RS(C1)⊕RS(C2)| has important intrinsic limitations. First,
we cannot compare RSD across sub-datasets because the size
of the routing state depends on the size of the dataset. Even
worse, CPs with low prefix visibility would have smaller
routing states compared to CPs with high prefix visibility.
In other words, with the definition above, RSD would be
an absolute, non-normalized value having high sensitivity to
both the size of the dataset and the difference in the number
of prefixes seen by each CP. We adapt the definition of the
metric to mitigate the impact of this unwanted sensitivity by
(i) restricting our analysis to only “full” CP, i.e., CPs that
see at least half of the global RIB; and (ii) normalizing the
metric according to the size of the union between the two
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Fig. 8. CDF of the Routing State Distance when computed on all the ASes and
only on the portion of the Internet topology relative to iBGP policy inference.





Observe that this definition of RSD∗ is equivalent to the
Jaccard distance between RS(C1) and RS(C2). As opposed
to RSD, RSD∗ does not tend to report lower distances as
the size of RS(C1) or RS(C2) decreases. Moreover, it ranges
from 0 (the two CPs see exactly the same AS-paths) to 1 (the
two CPs see completely disjoint AS-paths), irrespective of the
size of the routing states.
In order to compare detected links with inferred ASes, we
compute routing states on (i) the full dataset, and (ii) a sub-
dataset without all BGP routes that do not contain any AS
performing iBGP policy. Observe that, in the latter case, the
excluded routes are irrelevant to the iBGP policy inference
technique, that is, applying the technique to either the full
dataset or the sub-dataset yields identical results.
Fig. 8 shows the CDF of the normalized RSD between all
possible pairs of CPs for both detected links (black curve) and
inferred ASes (red curve). The normalized RSD is generally
higher for links. This means that distant CPs are able to provide
more information on links than on inferred ASes, and vice
versa for close CPs. This matches the intuition that collecting
different BGP routes enables us to detect larger portions of the
Internet. Hence, maximizing RSD∗ with respect to existing
CPs is a good placement strategy for new CPs if we want to
improve link detection. On the contrary, the same strategy does
not look effective to improve our ability to infer iBGP policy.
Indeed, while link detection can benefit from CPs observing
different and potentially unrelated portions of the network,
inferring iBGP policy requires a minimum overlap among
collected BGP routes. That is, in order to detect an AS applying
iBGP policies, we need CPs to collect different AS paths that
traverse that AS for the same prefix.
C. Placing New CPs
Sec. V suggests that, if we added new CPs randomly
following the same distribution of the existing infrastructure,
the marginal utility of new CPs would be higher for iBGP
policy inference than it would be for link detection (see Fig. 4
and 5). However, Sec. VI-A indicates that, for both metrics,
the marginal utility will decrease as more CPs are added and as
the Internet becomes denser. One might ask whether placement
strategies exist that maximize the marginal utility of new CPs
for both metrics.
Numerous contributions tackled the problem of extending
BGP collection infrastructures in such a way to maximize the
marginal utility of new CPs with respect to link detection (see,
e.g., [13], [26]). Those contributions highlight the need for
deploying CPs in stub ASes and IXPs to improve the detection
of peer-peer links. However, CPs in IXPs have low prefix
visibility, and Sec. IV (see Fig. 3) suggests that CPs with low
prefix visibility are more likely to improve link detection rather
than iBGP policy inference. Hence, CP placement techniques
proposed for link detection are likely not to maximize the
marginal utility of new CPs for iBGP policy inference.
This section generalizes those observations, suggesting that
a placement strategy can hardly maximize the marginal utility
of new CPs for inference of both link and ASes with iBGP
policies. Sec. VI-A suggests that the impact of new CPs
is limited to the proximity of the deployment location (see
Fig. 7), even though this happens more frequently for link
detection than for iBGP policy inference. Moreover, the anal-
ysis in Sec. VI-B shows that, contrary to topology discovery,
iBGP policy inference poses a fundamental trade-off about
the amount of overlap in the BGP routes collected by new
CPs. In fact, both a perfect overlap and no overlap lead to a
null marginal utility. Ideally, a placement strategy for iBGP
policy inference would then need some heuristics to find a
good balance between those two limit cases. Devising such a
strategy remains an interesting open problem.
VII. RELATED WORK
Previous works used public BGP dataset in a wide va-
riety of manners, e.g., for analyses on AS-level topology
discovery [18], commercial relationships between ASes [27],
BGP update churn [28], prefix allocation and aggregation [29],
prefix reachability [21], and many more. The significance of
contributions that tried to match BGP control-plane data with
data-plane measurements was questioned by Bush et al., who
showed in [21] that BGP data are inadequate for this goal.
Indeed, not only the as-path attribute correlates poorly with
traceroute-like measurements, but even prefix reachability is
independent of the presence of BGP route for that prefix. Our
study focuses on biases of collected control-plane data.
Among the studies that use BGP data, techniques to
discover the AS-level Internet topology are definitely the most
common. It is widely accepted that the BGP route collection
infrastructure is reasonably accurate to study links between a
customer and its provider, while links between eBGP peers are
not adequately represented in the dataset [12], [30]. Such a bias
is so relevant that most contributions on the optimal placement
of new CPs [13], [26] try to counter it by adding new CPs in
ASes at the bottom of the Internet hierarchy. While we confirm
both the existence of the bias and the effectiveness of this
placement strategies for topology inference, our results show
that other metrics are not equally affected by the same bias
and, therefore, placement strategies designed for one metric
are unlikely to achieve good marginal utility for others.
Mu¨hlbauer et al. [20] noted that, by comparing BGP
routes to the same destination prefix and simultaneously active
for a given AS (i.e., route diversity), it is possible to infer
information about the internal structure of that AS. By looking
deeper at the BGP attributes of those simultaneously active
routes, we can detect iBGP policies [3]. In this paper, we
investigate whether iBGP policy inference is affected by the
same biases that hold for AS-level topology discovery.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we study the biases of public BGP datasets
with respect to the inference of iBGP policies inside ISPs. We
define a methodology to expose biases even in the absence
of ground truth, and we apply our methodology to compare
the biases for iBGP policies with the ones affecting AS-level
topology discovery. Our study is focused on the sensitivity of
iBGP policy inference and AS-level topology discovery along
three main dimensions: (i) visibility of prefixes, (ii) number
of available collector peers, and (iii) location of the collector
peers. Moreover, we investigate the marginal utility of newly
added collector peers and we discuss the implications in terms
of optimal placement of new vantage points.
Our results suggest that the BGP dataset is differently
biased for iBGP policy inference than it is for AS-level
topology discovery. Consistent with this, we also found that
algorithms to place new collector peers for AS-level topology
discovery, e.g., [12], [13], hardly maximize the benefit for other
metrics (i.e., iBGP policy inference in the studied case). Hence,
extensions of the BGP monitoring infrastructure need to be
driven by a fixed set of objectives, and different infrastruc-
tures can deserve different purposes. Finding a strategy that
optimizes the marginal utility of new collector peers for iBGP
policy inference (or, a fortiori, for multiple metrics at the same
time) remains an interesting open problem.
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